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COLOR BLINDNESS BUT NOT MYOPIA:
ANEWLOOKATSTATEACTION,EQUALPROTECTION,
AND "PRIVATE" RACIAL DISCRIMINATIONt

Theodore ]. St. Antoine*
Justice Frankfurter has remarked: "In law also the right
answer usually depends on putting the right question. " 1
For nearly one hundred years now the courts have been putting
certain key questions whenever confronted by the claim that a
person was being deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution. From the time the "separate-but-equal" doctrine was
enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson2 until it was repudiated in the
School Segregation Gases} two principal questions were likely to
be asked about any classification based on racial grounds: (I) Did
the classification result, not merely in the creation of separate
facilities for the different races, but in the creation of unequal
facilities? (2) Did the classification result from "state action," i.e.,
from the exercise of the state's legislative, executive, or judicial
powers? Only if both questions were answered in the affirmative
was there an unconstitutional deprivation of equal protection.
In the School Segregation Gases of 1954 the Supreme Court
held that in the field of public education, separate facilities were
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t This paper was awarded the first prize in the 1960 Broomfield Essay Competition
at The University of Michigan. -Ed.
• Member, District of Columbia, Michigan, and Ohio Bars. - Ed.
l See, e.g., Estate of Rogers v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 410, 413 (1943).
2 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding validity of state statutes requiring separate accommodations for whites and Negroes on intrastate railroads). The Supreme Court never
applied the separate-but-equal doctrine to uphold laws limiting the right to own real
estate, apparently because of the unique status of realty and the special protection afforded
property under the Constitution. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 78-81 (1917);
Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930).
3 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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"inherently unequal."4 This of course did not expressly dispose
of the separate-but-equal doctrine in other areas such as public
transportation and recreational facilities. 5 But in a subsequent
series of brusque, sometimes cryptic per curiam decisions and
orders, the Court left no doubt that the death knell had sounded
for separate-but-equal.6 Classification on the basis of race was no
longer open to a state.
With the separate-but-equal factor effectively eliminated, the
courts in racial discrimination or classification cases have now
concentrated their attention on what apparently seems to them the
remaining key question: Does the classification involve "state action"? Close examination of recent Supreme Court and lower
federal court decisions, especially those of the past half dozen
years, provides strong evidence that the courts have not been, in
the words of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, "putting the right question."
The inevitable result of this failure will be an increasing tendency
to come up with the wrong answer. Perhaps the courts' sounder
instincts will somehow save them from this tendency.7 But surely
it would be better if the Supreme Court could arrive at a more
precise formulation of the crucial question in these cases - if only
for the greater guidance of literal-minded lower court judges and
the greater edification of theoretically-minded academicians.
Specifically, nicer precision is called for in the formulation of
the issue when the courts must look at racial discrimination prac4 Id. at 495. Previously, the application of the "separate-but-equal" doctrine to public
educational facilities may have been assumed by the Supreme Court, but it had never
been precisely decided. Id. at 491 n.8; see Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ.,
175 U.S. 528 (1899); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). In the decade and a half
preceding Brown v. Board of Educ., the Supreme Court in a series of cases involving
education on the graduate school level held that separate white and Negro facilities were
not in fact equal, in view of the superior benefits enjoyed by the white students. Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
5 See K.auper, Segregation in Public Education: The Decline of Plessy v. Ferguson,
52 M1mr. L. REv. 1137 (1954).
6 Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating and remanding per curiam "for consideration in the light of the Segregation Cases ••• and conditions
that now prevail," 202 F .2d 725 (6th Cir. 1953) (public amphitheater leased for the holding
of opera performances for the public); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955),
affirming per. curiam 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches); Holmes v. Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955), vacating per curiam 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (public golf courses
and parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), affirming per curiam 142 F. Supp. 707
(M.D. Ala. 1956) (state-regulated public transportation); State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey,
359 U.S. 533 (1959), affirming per curiam 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958) (state-regulated
athletic contests).
7 See discussion of Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956), and related
cases, infra, part II.

1961]

PRIVATE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

995

ticed or initiated by persons or groups traditionally regarded as
"private." What question or questions should be posed by a court
in this type of case to determine whether there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right, particularly the right to equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment? To put the
problem in perspective, and, hopefully, to point the way toward its
solution, it is first necessary to review the development of Supreme
Court doctrine regarding constitutional limitations on "state" and
"private" action, and to analyze some of the possible implications
of these doctrines.

I.

IN SEARCH OF EQUALITY: THE COURSE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE ON "PRIVATE" DISCRIMINATION

The fourteenth amendment, ratified in 1868, provides: " ...
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." And with similar
emphasis upon the "State" as the target of the prohibition, the
fifteenth amendment, ratified in 1870, declares that the right of
United States citizens to vote "shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
There is both contemporaneous evidence and subsequent
scholarly judgment that these prohibitions were intended to operate against "individual" or "private" action as well as against
"state" action. 8 Resort was even had at an early date to the rather
sophisticated argument that individual or private action is necessarily covered because all action is either forbidden, required, or
permitted by the state.9
See FLACK, THE AooPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 262-63 (1908).
o Representative Lawrence of Ohio, discussing pending civil rights legislation in 1874,
said of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment:
"The object of this provision is to make all men equal before the law. If a State
permits inequality in rights to be created or meted out by citizens or corporations enjoying
its protection it denies the equal protection of the laws. What the State permits by its
sanctions, having the power to prohibit, it does in effect itself..•.
"When it is said 'no State shall deny to any person the equal protection' of these
laws, the word 'protection' must not be understood in any restricted sense, but must include
every benefit to be derived from laws. The word 'deny' must include an omission by any
State to enforce or secure the equal rights designed to be protected. There are sins of
omission as well as commission. A State which omits to secure rights denies them.'' 2
CONG. REc. 412 (1874).
For recent discussions of the proposition that all action in a sense involves state
action, see Barnett, What Is State Action? 24 ORE. L. REv. 227, 228 (1945); Shanks, "State
Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 213, 218 (1956); Horowitz, The
Misleading Search for "State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 So. CAL. L. REv.
208, 208-09 (1957).
8
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The issue was seemingly put to rest by the Supreme Court in
the Civil Rights Cases10 of 1883. In the Civil Rights Act of 1875,11
Congress had provided both criminal and civil sanctions against
"any person" denying equal accommodations in inns, public conveyances, theaters, and other places of public amusement because
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Speaking
through Mr. Justice Bradley, the Court struck down the enactment
as beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Of the fourteenth amendment12 it was said: "It is state action of a particular
character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual
rights is not the subject matter of the amendment."13 Then, in a
sentence strangely marked by overtones of potential enlargement
as well as by the obvious note of restriction, Mr. Justice Bradley
commented:
"The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any
such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual; an invasion of the rights of the injured party, it is
true, whether they affect his person, his property or his
reputation; but if not sanctioned in some way by the State, or
not done under state authority, his rights remain in full force,
and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the laws of
the State for redress."14
Mr. Justice Harlan dissented vigorously. In flat contradiction
to the majority, he asserted that the fourteenth amendment created
federal rights, enforceable directly by Congress, against all racial
discrimination except that of a purely social nature. But he was
willing also to meet the majority on its own ground. Even conceding that adverse state action was an essential element of an abridgment of rights under the amendment, said he, the Act of 1875
could be upheld. For railroads, innkeepers, and places of public
amusement are "agents or instrumentalities of the State, because
they are charged ·with duties to the public, and are amenable, in
respect of their duties and functions, to governmental regulation."15
10 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
11 Sections l, 2, 18 Stat. 335·36 (1875).
12 The consideration in the Civil Rights Cases of the effect of the thirteenth amendment, which concededly operates against private persons in forbidding slavery or involuntary servitude, is not pertinent to the present inquiry into the constitutional limitations on
other forms of racial discrimination.
13 109 U.S. at 11.
14 ld. at 17. (Emphasis added.)
15 Id. at 58-59.
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Despite certain contrary historical testimony, and despite the
high authority of Mr. Justice Harlan, whose lone, stirring dissent
in Plessy was later to be so fully vindicated, it is safe to say that no
member of the present Supreme Court has seriously questioned
the abstract soundness of the fundamental principle affirmed by
the majority in the Civil Right Gases. The pertinent provisions
of the fourteenth amendment operate only against "such action as
may fairly be said to be that of the States."16
How, then, does a state act? Very early the Supreme Court
declared that a state may act through its legislative, executive, or
judicial authorities, adding broadly that whoever acts "by virtue
of public position under a state government . . . acts in the name
and for the State, and is clothed ·with the State's power," so that
"his act is that of the State."17 A state judge may thus be subject
to federal criminal penalties for excluding Negroes from jury
service, and thereby depriving colored defendants of equal protection, even though he acts on his own initiative and without the
authorization or compulsion of state law.18 And a municipal ordinance is state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment,
even though the provisions of the particular ordinance may be in
conflict with the state constitution.19
What if the actions of individual public officials not only are
unauthorized by state law, but also are in direct violation of it?
May their conduct still fairly be said to be that of the state? For
some time the Supreme Court vacillated on this issue, but the
question was finally resolved in Screws v. United States.20 A
Georgia sheriff and two assistants brutally beat to death a young
Negro they had arrested on a ·warrant charging him with the theft
of a tire. There was evidence that the sheriff had a personal
grudge against the Negro. The sheriff and his assistants were
convicted of willfully denying rights under the fourteenth amendment while acting under color of state law. Although the Su16 Vinson, C.J., speaking for a unanimous Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13
{1948).
17 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880). See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880) (state statute excluding Negroes from jury service); Yick. Wo v. Hopkins,
ll8 U.S. 356 (1886) {discriminatory administration of county licensing law by board of
supervisors so as to exclude Chinese laundries).
18 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880).
19 Home Telephone &: Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
20 325 U.S. 91 (1945); see also United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)
("misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of' state
law"); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
But cf. Darney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904).
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preme Court technically reversed, six Justices21 were in agreement on one basic proposition. Acts of an individual state official
in the discharge of his official duties are state action, even though
the particular acts may violate state law. Effectively, then, the
fourteenth amendment reaches all the formally designated agents
of the state whenever they are performing official functions.
So there is left that vast area of so-called "private" action. The
individual householder invites to his cocktail parties only persons
with a pigmentation akin to his own. All the individual householders in a community sign agreements they will not sell their
homes to Negroes. The great insurance company runs a picturebook residential community and sees that it stays antiseptically
Caucasian. The department store chain employs colored janitors
but not colored accountants. The philanthropist dies and leaves
his millions to build a school for white orphans. Under what circumstances, if any, are such activities subject, either directly or
indirectly, to the fourteenth amendment's prohibition against the
denial of "equal protection"?
The courts of course have had no trouble finding state action
when a state statute or city ordinance affirmatively requires a private person to act in a discriminatory manner. A statute requiring
an employer to dismiss all alien employees in excess of 20 percent
of his working force was thus invalid as a deprivation of equal
protection.22 But an injunction preventing state officials from
enforcing such discriminatory legislation may not be the only
direct remedy available. Where state law required a bus company
to maintain racial segregation, the company has been held liable in
damages for enforcing the unconstitutional statute, on the ground
that it was acting "under color of state law."23 The Supreme Court
itself has pointed the way toward what might become an even
broader approach for holding "private" action subject to constitutional limitations. It has said that a state statute was invalid which
affirmatively permitted, though it did not require, a railroad to
provide unequal transportation facilities for whites and Negroes.24
21 Stone, C.J., and Black, Douglas, Reed, Rutledge, and Murphy, JJ. Dissenting were
Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson, JJ.
22Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915). See also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
23 Flemming v. South Carolina Electric & Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955).
24 McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914). See also Missouri ex
rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d
531 (5th Cir. 1960). That state action may be found in official inaction or failure to pro•
tect private rights is indicated by Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4tb Cir. 1943);
Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945); Lynch v. United States, 189
F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951). See also Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
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And the Court has seemed to indicate in such instances that the
federal courts could entertain a suit directly against the railroads
for an injunction restraining them from taking advantage of the
state legislation permitting them to discriminate.
The sharpest acceleration in the forward thrust of "state action"
into areas formerly deemed private has come in the past fifteen
years or so. In several significant cases the Supreme Court has held
or has suggested that certain actions of "private" groups or organizations are subject to constitutional limitations. In each of
these situations there seems to have been present one or more of
the following three crucial elements: (I) the private body was
exercising a basic state function, typically with the affirmative
cooperation of the state; 215 (2) the private body was invoking affirmative state action by seeking judicial enforcement of a private contract;26 or (3) the private body had derived its power to act in a
particular capacity or engage in a specific activity, usually monopolistic or exclusive, by virtue of a statute, and was regulated in the
exercise of this power by governmental authority.27 Cases in the
first two categories bear especially close examination.28
Terry v. Adams29 was the culmination of a series of efforts by
certain white citizens of Texas to thwart the right of Negroes to
vote. Previously, in Smith v. Allwright,30 the Supreme Court had
held that where primary elections in a state are an integral part of
the election process and are conducted by a political party under
215 Smith

v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946);

Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953). Attempts to eliminate alleged racial discrimination
within labor unions by holding them to constitutional standards on a somewhat similar
theory were rejected in Williams v. Yellow Cab Co., 200 F.2d 302, 307 (3d Cir. 1952)
(union not exercising "a basic state function''), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 840 (1953), Ross v.
Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957), and Oliphant v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen, 262 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959), but were viewed
favorably in Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P .2d 831 (1946).
26 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
27 Steele v. Louisville&: N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (exclusive collective bargaining
representative required by Congress to represent all members of a craft without discrimination); Public Utilities Com.m'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (public transport utility
specifically permitted by governmental commission to operate radio programs); Railway
Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (exclusive collective bargaining representative expressly authorized by Congress to enter into union shop agreements otherwise
invalid under state law). See also Machinists v. Street, 215' Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959),
prob. juris. noted, 361 U.S. 807 (1959).
28 Cases in the third category involve federally-regulated bodies, and so the governmental action at issue was that of Congress rather than that of a state. And the primary
attention of the Court was on the action of Congress or of a governmental regulatory
agency, not on the action of the private body itself.
29 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
80 321 U.S. 649 (1944), overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935). See also
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
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state statutory authority, the action of the party in excluding
Negroes from voting is the action of the state. Consequently the
fifteenth amendment, which is identical to the fourteenth in applying only to state action, forbade such exclusion. The last resort
of the whites in a particular Texas county was the Jaybird Party.
The Jaybirds also excluded Negroes from voting in their primary.
Victors in the Jaybird primary almost invariably had no opposition
in the Democratic primaries and general elections that followed.
But the Jaybirds contended that they were merely a self-governing
voluntary club, not a state-regulated political party, and that the
fifteenth amendment did not prohibit their racial exclusions.
In Terry eight Justices, on somewhat diverse grounds, found
that the fifteenth amendment reached the Jaybirds. Justices Black,
Douglas, and Burton declared that the Jaybird primary had become
an integral, indeed the effective, part of the elective process, observing: "For a state to permit such a duplication of its election
processes is to permit a flagrant abuse of those processes. . . .''31
Justice Frankfurter emphasized the full participation of the county's elected officials, and concluded that this fastened responsibility
on "the State, through the action and abdication of those whom
it has clothed with authority...." 32 Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and
Justices Clark, Reed, and Jackson deemed the Jaybirds to be part
and parcel of the Democratic Party, so that A llwright governed.
Yet they went on to say that "when a state structures its electoral
apparatus in a form which devolves upon a political organization
the uncontested choice of public officials, that organization itself,
in whatever disguise, takes on those attributes of government which
draw the Constitution's safeguards into play."33
So there is substantial sentiment on the Court that when a state
permits private organizations to take over the electoral processes "matters of high public interest" in Mr. Justice Cardozo's phrase they become "to that extent the organs of the State itself.''34
An extension of this sentiment may be reflected in Marsh v.
Alabama.35 Chickasaw, Alabama, was wholly owned by the Gulf
Shipbuilding Corporation, but otherwise had "all the characteristics of any other American town." Posted company rules prohibited solicitation without permission. A Jehovah's Witness distrib31345 U.S. at 469. (Emphasis added.)
32 Id. at 477. (Emphasis added.)
33 Id. at 484. (Emphasis added.)
34 Cardozo, J., speaking for the Court in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 (1932),
85 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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uting religious literature on a sidewalk. accessible to the public was
told to leave. When she declined she was arrested by a county
deputy sheriff, who was paid by the company to be the town's
policeman. The Witness was convicted in state court for remaining on another's premises after being told to depart. The Supreme
Court reversed on the basis of the first and fourteenth amendments.
Mr. Justice Black for the Court spoke of the operation of the
town as being a "public function," and concluded that property
rights in the premises were not sufficient to justify "the State's
permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as
to restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such
restraint by the application of a state statute.'>s 0 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, was less cautious than he afterward proved in
Terry about the necessity of pinning down formal state action.
In Marsh it was enough for him that "a company-owned town is a
town. In its community aspects it does not differ from other
towns.'' 37
Subsequent references to Marsh make it difficult to say whether
the decision turned chiefly on the state's criminal enforcement of
the company's exclusion, or on the special status of the town itself
as a source of state action.38 But plainly it would have been a
different question had an individual householder invoked police
assistance against the Witness.39
Judicial enforcement of private contracts as state action was the
central issue in Shelley v. Kraemer.40 Negroes purchased land in
a district which had been made subject to covenants restricting
the use or occupancy of the realty to Caucasians. Relying on the
covenants, other property owners obtained a state court injunction
to restrain the Negroes from occupying the land they had purchased. The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Negroes
had been deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment.
It was not the restrictive covenants "standing alone," nor "voluntary adherence to their terms," that violated the fourteenth
amendment, said the Court, since that amendment "erects no shield
86 ]d. at 507, 509.
37 Id. at 510.
38 Compare Breard

v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 643 (1951), with Frankfurter, J., con•
curring in Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268,277 (1951).
so See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943).
40 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (similar result under
the due process clause of the fifth amendment in the District of Columbia).
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against merely private conduct."41 But the active intervention of
the state courts, bringing to bear the coercive power of government, was state action "in the full and complete sense of the
phrase. " 42 The restrictions sought to be created by the private
agreement could not have been imposed by state statute or local
ordinance.43 So neither could they be enforced by a state court.
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Court, scornfully
brushed aside the argument that the state courts were not depriving Negroes of equal protection so long as they stood ready to
enforce restrictive covenants against white persons as well. "Equal
protection of the laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."44
Five years later, in Barrows v. ]ackson,45 the Court settled a
question left unanswered by Shelley. A racial restrictive covenant,
as well as being unenforceable in equity by injunction, was held
to be unenforceable at law for damages against a co-covenantor who
sold to a Negro. On the award of damages as an exercise of state
action, the Court was brief: "The result of that sanction by the
State would be to encourage the use of restrictive covenants. To
that extent, the State would put its sanction behind the covenants. "46
With its emphasis upon state "sanctions" as the state action
calling into play fourteenth amendment safeguards, the Court was
harking back to the words of Mr. Justice Bradley in the Civil
Rights Cases. And yet, seventy years later, the Court still seemed
no closer to asking itself: "Does it make any difference what type
of private conduct is sanctioned?" Shelley and Barrows had left
the Court with a constitutional doctrine of sweeping scope, uncritically adopted, its implications unplumbed. Much can be admired in the effort to add force to Mr. Justice Harlan's noble dictum, "Our Constitution is color-blind."47 But with a short-sighted
approach, unforeseen pitfalls could well be expected. They were
not long in showing up.
41334 U.S. at 13. Cf. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (recognizing validity
of restrictive covenants as such, in the District of Columbia).
42 334 U.S. at 19.
43 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930).
44 334 U.S. at 22.
45 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
46 Id. at 254.
47 Dissenting in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
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CONSTITUTIONAL DocTRINE

HEADS TOWARD A DEAD END

Sergeant Rice was a Korean War casualty, and a Winnebago
Indian. His body was returned to Sioux City, Iowa, for burial.
After services were conducted at the grave site in a private cemetery, the cemetery management, having discovered the deceased's
non-Caucasian antecedents, refused to permit interment. Sergeant
Rice's wife sued the cemetery for damages for mental suffering.
The cemetery defended on the basis of a covenant in the contract
of sale of the burial lot limiting burial privileges to Caucasians.
The Iowa courts ruled that the clause was unenforceable, but that
it was not void and could be relied upon by the cemetery as a
defense to the damage action. 48 The Supreme Court affirmed by
an equally divided Court.49 In the meantime the Iowa legislature
had taken steps to prevent a recurrence of such a case - though it
provided no relief for Mrs. Rice. The Supreme Court granted a
rehearing, vacated its prior judgment of affirmance, and dismissed
the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.50 Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Black and Douglas dissented. On the issue
of "state action," Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the Court, did no
more than deliver himself of the view that it was a "complicated
problem."51
Cutter Laboratories :fired Doris Walker, supposedly on the
ground she was a Communist. But an arbitrator found there was
no "just cause" for the dismissal, ruling the company had waived
party membership as a basis. California refused to enforce the
arbitration award. Five members of the United States Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Clark, dismissed a 1VTit of certiorari.52 To the Court, all that was involved was a state construction of "just cause" in a local contract as being equivalent to
Communist Party membership, with no federal question being
presented. Shelley and Barrows were not even cited.
Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
Mr. Justice Black concurred, dissented strongly. Mr. Justice
48 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110
(1953). For a refusal to allow a residential racial restrictive covenant to be used as a
defense in a damage action, see Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
40 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 348 U.S. 880 (1954).
r;o Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
51 Id. at 72.
52 Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
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Douglas conceded that a private employer could arrange for an allDemocratic labor force. But government could not. "And," he
continued with rigorous logic, "if the courts lend their support to
any such discriminatory program, Shelley v. Kraemer . .. teaches
that the government has thrmrn its weight behind an unconstitutional scheme to discriminate against citizens by reason of their
political ideology."53
Would Mr. Justice Douglas deny a private householder police
assistance in barring Jehovah's Witnesses from his front porch,
while admitting Methodist ministers? Probably not. Here the
householder would be able to assert due process rights of his mrn
against governmental regulation. But at least Mr. Justice Douglas
seems to mean that whenever a private party cannot interpose
countervailing constitutional rights (and fair employment practices legislation does not deprive an employer of due process114 ),
then the state may not assist him in practicing discrimination forbidden to the state.55 And there is much in Shelley and Barrows,
taken at face value, to support the logic of such a conclusion. At
least the majority in Cutter Laboratories supplied no sound distinction.
The relationship of private action to state action again arose
to plague the Court in the Girard College case.56 Stephen Girard
died in 1831, leaving a fund in trust to run a school for "poor
white male orphans." The will named the City of Philadelphia as
trustee, and eventually the trust came to be administered by a city
board set up under a state statute. The board refused to admit two
applicants to the school solely because they were Negroes. The Supreme Court in a per curiam decision held that the board, as a
state agency, could not practice racial discrimination. Even though
the board was acting as a trustee, its action was state action. Perhaps Sioux City Cemetery and Cutter Laboratories had given the
Court pause; its only reliance was on the School Segregation Cases,
and Shelley was ignored.
The next move in Girard was obvious. The Pennsylvania
courts removed the state-created board as trustee, and appointed
53 Id. at 302-03.
54 See Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 1138 (1955).
55 For such an interpretation of the Cutter Laboratories dissent, see Abernathy, Ex•

pansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43
375, 415-16 (1958).
56 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
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a wholly private trustee.57 But the Supreme Court declined the
gambit, denying certiorari.58 In view of Shelley, was there no
longer state action merely because the state courts were enforcing
the racially-discriminatory will through a private rather than a
public trustee?5 9
Then came Boynton v. Virginia. 60 A Negro law student, traveling by bus from Washington, D. C., to Montgomery, Alabama,
entered the white section of a restaurant in a bus terminal during
a short stopover and demanded service. When he refused to leave
on being ordered, he was arrested and convicted of criminal trespass. His petition for certiorari presented only constitutional questions under the commerce clause and the fourteenth amendment.
But the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, went far out
of its way to dodge the constitutional issue. It ruled in the Negro
passenger's favor on a much more narrow statutory ground, by
stretching the Motor Carrier Act's anti-discrimination ban to cover
even a restaurant operated by a private lessee of an independent
terminal company in a terminal at which interstate buses make
regular stopovers. Are even the dissenters in Cutter Laboratories
becoming dubious about the reach of their doctrine? At least there
is no indication they are winning new adherents for it.
This impression is reinforced by the latest word from the Supreme Court. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority 61 the
Court held that a Negro had been denied equal protection when
refused service in a restaurant occupying leased space in a public
parking building. But at least as significant as the holding was
the tone of Mr. Justice Clark's majority opinion. It was a model
57 See Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S.
570 (1958).
fiS Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts of Philadelphia, 357 U.S. 570
(1958).
59 See generally Shanks, "State Action" and the Girard Estate Case, 105 U. PA. L. REv.
213 (1956); Clark, Charitable Trusts, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Will of Stephen
Girard, 66 YALE L.J. 979 (1957).
oo 364 U.S. 454 (1960). The Court must next come to grips with state convictions of
Negro "sit-in" demonstrators in Gamer v. Louisiana, and related cases. (Nos. 617-619,
Oct. Term 1960). Certiorari was granted in these cases on March 20, 1961. 365 U.S. 840
(1961). The strategists for the Negro litigation managed to present the first Supreme
Court test of the "sit-in" issue in an unusually favorable posture. Unlike the typical
situation in which colored demonstrators have been convicted of criminal trespass upon
the complaint of a private store owner, Gamer and its companion cases involve Negro
students who were prosecuted for a breach of the peace after being arrested by police
officers apparently acting on their own initiative. See N.Y. Times, March 21, 1961, p. 18,
col. 3.
61 365 U.S. 715 (1961), reversing 157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960), 59 MICH. L. REv. 450 (1961).
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of circumspection, if not irresolution. The Court's decision was
expressly limited to its facts, and then every fact was culled out
that might possibly serve to link the restaurant with the public
authorities. The parking facility was built, owned, and operated
by a state agency. The leased premises were not surplus public
property, but were originally intended for commercial tenants as
an essential part of the plan for financing the project. The conjunction of restaurant and parking area made each more attractive
to patrons. Both facilities by their very nature were designed for
serving the public. And the state, in its lease, could have required
the restaurant to operate nondiscriminatorily. Mr. Justice Clark
even took note of the state flag flying atop the building.
Mr. Justice Stewart concurred on a more narrow ground. He
pointed out that in upholding the restaurant's right to discriminate, the state court had relied on a statute permitting a restaurant
proprietor to refuse service to persons "offensive to the major part
of his customers." For Mr. Justice Stewart, the fourteenth amendment was thus violated by a legislative authorization for a discriminatory classification based exclusively on color. Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Whittaker dissented. They contended the case
should have been remanded to the state court for a clarification of
the precise basis for its refusal to grant the Negro declaratory and
injunctive relief.
Nothing was heard from the three Cutter Laboratories dissenters, all of whom were apparently willing to go quietly along with
Mr. Justice Clark's reasoning. Not one raised an obvious point:
What had happened to the Shelley-Barrows doctrine of judicial
action as state action? Could it not be argued that the proscribed
state action was to be found right in the state court order denying
the Negro a remedy, thereby lending the state's assistance to the
private discrimination? Or may Shelley be invoked only against a
party who, in furtherance of a discriminatory purpose, is affirmatively seeking judicial aid to alter the status quo? Fortunately for
the Court, the facts of Burton justified an entirely different approach, and once again the hard questions implicit in Shelley and
Barrows could be avoided.
Lacking such Supreme Court escape hatches as denials or dismissals of certiorari, the lower federal courts and the state courts
have meanwhile had to :flounder as best they could amidst a whole
wave of cases on the possible constitutional implications of "private" action.
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As if anticipating Burton, the courts readily have found the
requisite state action to invoke constitutional protections when a
state leases its facilities to a private person or group for carrying on
activities or offering services open to the public. So racial discrimination may not be practiced by the lessees of public parks or golf
courses,62 or of a cafeteria in a county courthouse.63 But it is undoubtedly significant that in these situations the lessees' activities
by their very nature are accessible to the public generally. Surely
a state should not be foreclosed from leasing a public auditorium
for a convocation of the Ancient Order of Hibernians.
The mere receipt by an organization of state funds, financial
support, or other assistance has not been deemed enough to constitute the recipient a state instrumentality, 64 unless the effective
power of management and control is also lodged in the state.65
Obviously the introduction of state assistance invites the closest
scrutiny of particular facts. Tax exemptions for charitable institutions might be one thing, and substantial support of the only hospital in a county quite another.
Persistent efforts to find state action in the private operation
of housing projects, public transportation, and places of public
amusement echo curiously the three types of facilities which Mr.
Justice Harlan in the Civil Rights Cases regarded as state instrumentalities because of their public function. Housing developments, no matter how large, have generally continued to avoid
being tagged with governmental attributes.66 In transportation67
62 Department of Conservation v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 838 (1956); Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957). See also Muir v.
Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954), vacating 202 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1953).
But cf. Charlotte Park &: Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956) (private grant of land for public parks, with
reverter if used by non-whites).
63 Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924
(1957). For a discussion of the status of lessees of public property under numerous other
federal and state court rulings, see 59 MICH. L. REv. 450 (1961).
64 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949) (four-to-three
decision), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950) (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting); Eaton v.
James Walker Memorial Hospital, 261 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984
(1959); (Warren, C.J., and Douglas and Brennan, JJ., dissenting). Cf. Vincennes University
v. Indiana, 14 How. (55 U.S.) 268 (1852) (grant of public land to university trustees did
not make trustees a public corporation).
61i Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326
U.S. 721 (1945).
66 Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied,
339 U.S. 981 (1950); Johnson v. Levitt &: Sons, 131 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa. 1955). But cf.
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
67 Flemming v. South Carolina Electric &: Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955); Boman
v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960). See also Chance v. Lambeth,
186 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1951), tert. denied, 341 U.S. 941 (1951).
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and amusement68 cases the courts have seemed to plant one foot
on a Harlan-type doctrine and one on a Shelley-type; they discourse
at length on the "public" nature of these facilities, even when privately operated, but then hunt for legislation requiring or permitting racial discrimination, or for enforcement of the discrimination
by the state police and courts, as the crucial element of state action.
Does this mean that the Shelley doctrine will be applied to the
point of forbidding all private discrimination based on a classification the state itself could not properly make, so long as there is
state enforcement in the picture? Quite clearly not. A man, for
example, can still bequeath property with a gift over if the legatee
marries a person of a prohibited faith. 69 And setting aside the
easiest case of the householder discriminating against guests on
racial grounds, the owner of an ice cream parlor can so far still
constitutionally secure police assistance against persons whose patronage is unwanted because of their race. 70
Logically extended, the Shelley-Barrows rule simply will not
go down. For by now it is plain that in every case before the courts
- in the probate of a will, in the enforcement of an arbitration
award regarding an employee discharge, in a criminal prosecution
for trespass on a private lawn - there is state action in a true
sense.71 And if the courts in adjudicating rights and relationships
between private persons must hold every private person to the
identical constitutional standards binding on a state, then effectively over eighty-five years of unbroken constitutional rulings go
by the board, and individual action for all practical purposes becomes subject to the fourteenth amendment. This no one now
seriously proposes. A search fo~ a new test is in order.
III. THE HARD QUESTION MAY BE RIGHT: WHEN Is PRIVATE
ACTION STATE ACTION?
Put to one side cases involving the acts of formally designated
state agents, or the acts of private persons or groups done pursuant
68 Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949); Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 183
F.2d 440 (8th Cir. 1950); Griffin v. Collins, 187 F. Supp. 149 (D. Md. 1960).
69 United States Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 202 Ore. 530, 275 P.2d 860 (1954);
Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955).
See also Charlotte Park &: Recreation Comm'n v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114
(1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 983 (1956). But cf. Claremont Improvement Club v.
Buckingham, 89 Cal. App. 2d 32, 200 P.2d 47 (1948) (court refused declaratory judgment
that restrictive covenant, standing alone, was valid, since such declaration would be state
action enforcing the covenant).
70 State v. Clyburn, 247 N.C. 455, 101 S.E.2d 295 (1958). Cf. Williams v. Howard
Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959).
71 See note 9 supra.
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to the formal mandate of a state. Concentrate upon the case which
involves only the acts of private persons having no formal connection to the state. At this point, surely, if the distinction between state action and private action is to have any genuine
meaning, the applicability of constitutional limitations must hinge
on the nature of the private activity itself - and not on the bare
presence of state enforcement or adjudication.
Assume that the Supreme Court's instincts, if not its rationalizations, have been sound, and that its actual holdings in both
Shelley and Cutter Laboratories are correct. Is there an essential
difference between a racial restrictive covenant and an employment
contract, or in the legal status of the parties relying on them, so
that in the one case but not in the other a federal constitutional
question is raised when enforcement is sought in the state courts?
A trenchant analysis of this problem has been made by Professor Glenn Abernathy of the University of South Carolina.72 For
him the key to the solution lies in the distinction, elaborated in
such Supreme Court decisions as Collins v. Hardyman,7 8 between
a person's federal rights and his state rights. Professor Abernathy
proceeds as follows. Only federal rights, and not state rights, are
secured or protected by the federal constitution. Two willing
persons may have a state right, though not a federal right, to enter
into a contractual relationship. But they do have a federal right
under the fourteenth amendment that the state shall not assert its
authority, on the basis of race or color, to interfere with their
contract. Similarly, a Negro has a state right, not a federal right,
to be free from private interference with his access to state property
opened to the public use. But he does have a federal right that a
state court shall not declare it to be state policy in such a situation
that whites have a right of access and Negroes do not.
On the other hand, continues Abernathy, a Negro has no right,
either federal or state, to be hired by an unwilling employer (in
the absence of special legislation), or to be admitted to an unwilling
householder's premises. So no constitutional question is presented
when a state acts in furtherance of such private racial discrimination. Abernathy rounds out his analysis by allowing one type of
privately operated activity to be classified as governmental, and
thus subject to constitutional limitations. This category embraces
the functions "which are indispensable to the maintenance of
7Z Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CoRNELL L.Q. 375 (1958).
78 341 U.S. 651 (1951). See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876);
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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democratic government,"74 such as the electoral processes at issue
in Terry v. Adams.
This critique is conceptually precise. It clears away much of
the fog generated by the Supreme Court, and in its emphasis on
specific rights can be a most useful analytical guide. But it too
suffers from defects. First of all, it may give a false illusion of comprehensiveness by failing to take account of the equivocal nature
of the term "right." For example, a daughter would seem to have
neither a federal nor state right to be her father's legatee, if he is
unwilling. Yet she would seem to have a right to contract an interracial marriage with a willing Negro, which the state could not
constitutionally prohibit solely on the basis of race. 75 Would the
state be forbidden, by analogy to Barrows, to enforce her father's
will insofar as it provided for forfeiture of her legacy if she went
through with the prospective interracial marriage?76 Does it make
a difference that the exercise of contractual rights on the part of
two willing parties is being penalized on racial grounds at the
behest of a single hostile testator, rather than at the behest of a
united group of hostile landholders in a community?
This leads to the deeper objection to an Abernathy-type analysis. The development of constitutional theory must not be frozen
in the established molds of property and contract law. Concepts
must not be exalted at the expense of hard facts. It is settled that
a willing seller and a ·willing buyer cannot be stopped from concluding a realty transaction through judicial enforcement of a
racial restrictive covenant previously entered into by the nowwilling seller and ten other residents in a community. Will the
state be allowed to stand idly by while ten thousand residents in a
community form a single realty corporation, sell all their land to
it while retaining ground-rental rights, and then through resolutions of the corporation's board of directors make the corporation
a "single" unwilling seller or lessor of land to non-Caucasians?
Perhaps the right answer, or less ambitiously the right question, lies not in Shelley and Barrows at all, but in Terry v. Adams17
and Marsh v. Alabama.18 In these latter cases the Supreme Court
grappled with situations in which the state had "permitted" pri74 Abernathy, supra note 72, at 407.
75 Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198

P .2d 17 (1948). But cf. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va.
80, 87 S.E.2d 749 (1955), judgment vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
76 See note 69 supra, and related text.
77 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
78 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See also notes 29 through 38 supra, and related text.
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vate organizations to act in "matters of high public interest," such
as the electoral process, and situations in which the state had "permitted" or acquiesced in their "performance of a public function,"
such as the operation of a town.79 And in these situations constitutional protections applied.
Here the real issues are framed. And the right question in the
long search after state action becomes: "Has the state permitted,
even by inaction, a private party to exercise such power over matters of a high public interest that to render meaningful the type
of rights protected by the fourteenth amendment, the action of the
private person or organization must be deemed, for constitutional
purposes, to be the action of the state?"
Obviously this is no open-sesame to the riddle of individual
cases. But it directs the inquiry to the proper considerations. And
above all it takes account of the realities of modern life.
The notion that certain private action should be treated as state
action is not new. English liberals such as John Stuart Mill and
T. H. Green came to realize that restricting the state alone was
not enough to ensure individual freedom. In some situations government must inhibit private action in the interest of greater freedom. Green in particular substantially identified state inaction
with intervention in situations where state passivity left powerful
private forces free to stifle individual liberties as effectively as
could a government. 80
In our mm day there has been similar sentiment. Professor
Mark DeWolfe Howe suggests that when groups "exercise power
in matters which directly concern the state they lose their privacy
and, claiming the prerogatives of sovereignty, may not object if
their action is treated as that of the state itself." 81 Professor W. G.
Friedmann discusses how the state "surrenders its power to the
new massive social groups of the industrial age," and pointedly
observes: "The corporate organizations of business and labor have
long ceased to be private phenomena." 82 And A. A. Berle states
flatly that "a corporation, especially in some national industrial
planning complex, is subject to the same constitutional limitations
79Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507
(1946); see also Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 (1932).
80 GREEN, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 206-10 (1895); see discussion in GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 48-49 (1959).
81 Howe, Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HAR.v. L. REv. 91, 95 (1953).
82 Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57
CoLUM. L. REv. 155, 165, 176 (1957).
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as those applicable to a branch of the federal government or of the
state government."83
The Supreme Court itself, even in applying the traditional rule
that state action alone can deprive a person of rights under the
fourteenth amendment, has added a cautionary word: "We do not
say that no conspiracy by private individuals could be of such
magnitude and effect as to work a deprivation of equal protection
of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under laws." 84
This is a frank though guarded recognition that there may be
instances where the effective application of great private power
shall have to be adjudged the equivalent of state action. Cautious
jurisprudents will understandably still yearn for at least a formalistic nexus between such private action and the officially designated
agencies of the state before calling into play constitutional protections and accompanying federal remedies. They may find some
comfort in the respectable amount of judicial authority for the
propositions that state inaction or official nonfeasance can be regarded as state action,85 that affirmative state permission for private
action can likewise be regarded as state action,86 and that in the
latter instance an injured individual can obtain a remedy directly
against the private party acting pursuant to the state's permission.87
It would not seem a hazardous additional leap to bridge the first
two of these propositions by equating state inaction in not stopping
certain private action with state permission for such action.88
Whatever the merit of all this theory, some will object, it would
be rash in the extreme to try it out in practice. Would it not mean
83 Berle, The Changing Role of the Corporation and Its Counsel, 10 THE REcoRD
266, 274, 275 (1955) (arguing that a great oil company could not adopt the policy of
refusing to sell gasoline to Negroes). See also HAu:, FREEDOM THROUGH LAW 374, 379
(1952) (suggesting that if employen; and a union tried to keep Negroes wholly out of a
trade, they would be unconstitutionally acting on matten; of "high public interest" with
the aid of the state); Jaffe, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 HAR.v. L. REV. 201 (1937):
Wirtz, Government by Private Groups, 13 LA. L. REV. 440 (1953). But cf. GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 156 (2d ed. 1921) (arguing that the by-laws of a corporation are not law).
84 Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 662 (1951) (holding mob attack on a meeting
did not deprive victims of the equal protection of the laws).
85 Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943): Picking v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945): Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951).
86 McCabe v. Atchison, T. &: S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914): Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
87 Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960). See also McCabe
v. Atchison, T. &: S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Flemming v. South Carolina Electric
and Gas Co., 224 F.2d 752 (4th Cir. 1955).
88 As to the handling of elections, is this not substantially what the Supreme Court
did in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)?
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bringing under the multitude of special laws covering governmental agents all the purely private persons who perform functions
supposedly of a "high public interest" or "fundamental" to our
society? And how are the courts going to be able to distinguish,
anyway, between what is "fundamental" and what is not?89 To
the first query it is enough to reply, with Mr. Justice Cardozo, that
the "test is not whether" such private persons "are the representatives of the State in the strict sense in which an agent is the representative of his principal. The test is whether they are to be classified as representatives of the State to such an extent and in such a
sense that the great restraints of the Constitution set limits to their
action." 00 That is the sort of problem to which judicial inventiveness is peculiarly adapted, and it need detain us no further.
One cannot blink the force of the second objection. But it is
rather a proper assessment of the scope of the challenge than a
genuine discrediting of the worth of the undertaking. No doubt
there would be moments of anguish when the courts tried to draw
the line in particular cases. Yet it is axiomatic that "the great body
of the law consists in drawing such lines." 01 And the Supreme
Court has itself noted that the grave question of the applicability
of constitutional protections might have to turn on the drawing of
a proper line between an unruly mob and a full-scale conspiracy,02
or between a political club and a political party performing a state
function. 03 If, as mounting testimony indicates,04 the kind of
rights intended to be safeguarded by the fourteenth amendment
can be rendered truly meaningful in the modern context only by
ascribing to certain so-called private actions the attributes of state
action, then the courts must risk the dangers and set about the
task.91s
How would this approach work in various specific circumstances? Racial restrictive covenants would fall, not because their
enforcement is discriminatory state action, but because in them89 For a voicing of these two objections, see Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action
Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375, 404-06 (1958).
90 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932).
111 Holmes, J., dissenting in Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926).
92 See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 662 (1951).
93 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 482 (1953).
1H See notes 80 through 83 supra and accompanying text.
95 See generally Pollock, Judicial Caution and Valour, in JURISPRUDENCE IN AcnoN 367
(1953); Holmes, J., speaking for the Court in Blinn v. Nelson, 222 U.S. 1, 7 (1911) ("constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some chances"). On the specific
issues involved here, see Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLUM. L. REv. 1083,
lll9-211 (1960).
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selves they represent an exercise, on the prohibited basis of race,
of the essentially public function of "zoning" real property.96 On
the other hand, the owner of the small corner ice cream parlor
would hardly be held to be engaged upon matters of high public
interest when, acting wholly independently, he draws the color
line among his employees and patrons.97 But a far more searching
scrutiny would await any analogous policies on the part of the
great nation-wide public utility. Discrimination here might be
substantially like the denial of a license to practice a craft, or like
the denial of ready access to an essential product or service. And
hard questions indeed would have to be asked about the effect of
racial discrimination in extensive suburban housing developments,
regardless of how unified the developments' ownership.
In short, the inquiry in each instance would primarily be addressed to the extent of the discriminator's power adversely to
affect constitutional-type rights on racial grounds -and not so
much to the relationships, in terms of traditional property or contract law, among the various parties. For convenience, however,
certain lines would likely be drawn rather mechanically. All restrictive covenants could be barred on the basis that any combination of persons for the purpose of zoning realty would be deemed
state action, even though a handful of such persons might actually
have less effective power than a relatively small, individually-o·wned
housing development, which would not be held to governmental
standards.
On the authority of Terry v. Adams,98 claims of a deprivation
of constitutional rights through the discriminatory exercise by a
private person or group of a public function could be litigated in
a suit brought in federal district court directly against the alleged
96 This would call for the effective, if not technical, overruling of Corrigan v. Buckley,
271 U.S. 323 (1926) (recognizing validity of restrictive covenants as such, in the District
of Columbia), which would hardly be a much-lamented loss.
97 A different case might well be presented, however, if a Negro were convicted and
subjected to a heavy penalty under special "emergency" legislation aimed at "sit-in"
demonstrators. See Va. Acts, chs. 96-98 (1960); N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1960, p. 38, col. 1,
Feb. 25, 1960, p. 1, col. 3. Discriminatory application of a statute fair on its face is
invalid. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). But cf. Randolph v. Virginia, 29 U.S.
Law Week 2523 (Va. Sup. Ct. App., April 24, 1961).
98345 U.S. 461 (1953). See also McCabe v. Atchison, T. &: S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U.S. 151
(1914); Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
99 Abernathy, on the contrary, would first demand formal state action, through an
adjudication by the state courts of the victim's rights, or at least through a failure by
state authorities, upon his request, to protect his federal or state rights. Abernathy,
Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CoRNELL
L.Q. 375, 399, 410, 417 (1958).
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offender.99 It would make no difference that the offender may have
been acting in violation of state law also.100
No intention exists that the analytical tool here fashioned
should be used as a blunt instrument for hammering out racial
equality under the guise of enforcing constitutional rights. Indeed,
despite the greater protection it would afford against racial discrimination on the part of massive corporate and other social structures, this whole analysis may be less helpful than a logical extension of the Shelley doctrine would be to the victims of
discrimination resulting from contractual or testamentary arrangements of a plainly private character. No matter. The purpose has
been to develop a theory which will make meaningful in our time
the rights sought to be protected by the fourteenth amendment
against invasion by the action of the state. At this late date any effort
to twist the federal system to do more might well merit something
akin to Judge Learned Hand's poignantly skeptical remonstrance
in a different but analogous context: " [A] society so riven that the
spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save; ... a society where
that spirit flourishes, no court need save; ... in a society which
evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture
of that spirit, that spirit in the end will perish."101
CONCLUSION

The aim has not been to supply a multitude of possible answers,
but to frame the one right question. The proposed test accepts
the premise, apparently now unopposed, that fourteenth amendment protections operate only against state action. It rejects the
mechanical application of any formula which would find the requisite state action whenever state authorities adjudicate private disputes or enforce private rights, thereby holding the action of pri100 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961);
see also Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
101 Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judidary to Civilization, THE SPIRIT
OF LmERTY 164 (3d ed. 1960). (Emphasis in the original.) To say the judiciary may have
to limit its role in furthering racial equality is but to emphasize that the legislative and
executive branches must enlarge their own. So far, for example, Congress has done little
to assert the power of the purse. However, one promising recent step was Executive
Order No. 10925, March 6, 1961, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (establishing the President's Committee
on Equal Employment Opportunity). And it may still be not too wild a dream that
private groups and individuals will increasingly take up the task. Only the most sanguine
could have predicted that Negro "sit-ins" in Atlanta, Georgia, would produce a peaceful
settlement formula whereby the demonstrations were to end in return for businessmen's
promises to desegregate lunch counters coincidently with the forthcoming integration of
local schools. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1961, p. I, ool. 2.
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vate persons subject in effect to constitutional limitations in these
situations. Such a formula proves too much, leads to logical absurdities, and most importantly fails to focus attention on the truly
significant factors.
The inquiry suggested here would concentrate on the nature
of the privately-operated activity itself. The existence of state
action for constitutional purposes would hinge on whether a private activity was so invested with the public interest, and so subject
to the control of powerful private forces, that effective impairment
of fourteenth amendment rights could result from the action of
these so-called private persons or groups. To the millions fighting
the battle for racial equality in our day, this would be no ultimate
weapon. But it should clear the way toward a realistic, meaningful
protection of their constitutional rights against invasion by combinations of private citizens or by the great social structures which,
in our complex modern society, increasingly come to perform
functions formerly reserved to the state. And that would be no
small gain.

